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Abstract 
Quasi-Bayesian theory uses convex sets of 
probability distributions and expected loss to 
represent preferences about plans. The the­
ory focuses on decision robustness, i .e., the 
extent to which plans are affected by devi­
ations in subjective assessments of probabil­
ity. Generating a plan means enumerating 
the actions to be taken and providing infor­
mation about the robustness of the actions. 
The present work presents plan generation 
problems that can be solved faster in the 
Quasi-Bayesian framework than within usual 
Bayesian theory. We investigate this on the 
planning to observe problem, i.e., an agent 
must decide whether to take new observa­
tions or not. The fundamental question is: 
How, and how much, to search for a "best" 
plan, based on the precision of probability 
assessments? Plan generation algorithms are 
derived in the context of material classifica­
tion with an acoustic robotic probe. A pack­
age that constructs Quasi-Bayesian plans is 
available through anonymous ftp. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Agents choose a plan of action by comparing its pos­
sible outcomes against the outcomes of other plans. 
Bayesian theory suggests that the basis for such com­
parisons is expected loss with a single probability dis­
tribution. Quasi-Bayesian theory, as axiomatized by 
Giron and Rios [Giron and Rios, 1980], also relies on 
expected loss, but uses a convex set of probability dis­
tributions to represent the agent's beliefs. Many schol­
ars agree that assuming an agent uses a single proba­
bility distribution is too restrictive [Breese and Fertig, 
1991; Levi, 1980; Shafer, 1987]. But there has been 
little agreement on how to make decisions with several 
distributions; many seem to think that theories with 
several distributions will always lead to intractable de­
cision making problems. 
Recently, great attention has been given to Robust 
Bayesian Statistics, which uses Quasi-Bayesian sets 
of distributions to represent imprecision of subjectivr 
probability assessments [Berger, 1985; Walley, 1991]. 
A robust decision is one that can be safely tahm dc�­
spite the imprecision in the probability assessments :  a 
non-robust decision is one that may produce wildly dif­
ferent results depending on the adopted distribution. 
In this paper, we explore a Quasi-Bayesian approach to 
plan generation. Generating a plan means enumerat­
ing the actions to be taken and providing information 
about the robustness of the actions. Our approac:h 
puts less emphasis on the search for unique "best" dc·'­
cisions than the usual Bayesian approach. Essentially, 
the agent is required to choose admissible decisions and 
to monitor and report robustness of these decisiot1s. 
We clarify the terms involved in this requirement in 
sections 2 and 3 .  
The central point of this work can be expressed hy 
a short fable. Suppose two archers try to hit a target 
(Figure 1). The first archer, a Bayesian, considers that 
hitting the center of the target is the only satisfactor.v 
result and orders a new, expensive bow. But the judgP 
only detects if an archer hits the hatched region. If 
both archers hit the hatched region, the judge con�icl­
ers them tied and calls other procedures to solve' tlw 
dispute. That does not prevent the Bayesian archer 
from trying to hit the center. The ser:oncl archer, a 
New Quasi-Bayesian archer, tries simply to n�ac:h tlw 
hatched circle with a cheap how. The 1'\<�w Qnasi­
Bayesian strategy seems wiser given the lack of pn•ti­
sion of the target. 
Our main contribution is to show that the An:lwrs 
Fable can be formalized for the planning to observe 
problem. The analogy here is that a point in the tar­
get corresponds to a distribution: the Bayesian agc'ut 
has one, the Quasi-Bayesian agent has many. The·· 
Bayesian seeks an answer to the question, how to r:rc·­
ate an optimal sequence of actions'? Such a question is 
very demading computationally. The Quasi-Baycsimt 
is attentive to the limitations of real probability as­
sessments and seeks an answer to the question, hem· t(l 
create a sequence of admissible actions and qnantii\ 
Figure 1: The Archers Fable 
the robustness of such actions? The surprising result 
is that we can answer the latter question without ex­
amining the full solution for the former question. To 
illustrate the details of our solution, we apply it to the 
planning to observe problem for material classification 
with a robotic probe. 
2 THE QUASI-BAYESIAN 
FRAMEWORK 
Consider this problem: an agent must choose a plan ai 
before the state of the world is known; after the state is 
revealed to be 61, the agent pays a loss l;1. The losses 
indicate the preferences of the agent. How should the 
agent compare two plans, a1 and a2? Quasi-Bayesian 
theory asserts that there is a nonempty convex set K of 
probability distributions which summarizes the agent 's 
beliefs. The set K is such that, for plans a1 and a2, 
a1 is at least as preferred as az iff E[llj] 2: E[lzj] for 
every probability distribution K, where E[·] denotes 
expected loss. Giron and Rios present a set of axioms 
that validate the preferences of a Quasi-Bayesian agent 
[Giron and Rios, 1980]. The set of probability distri­
butions K is called the credal set [Levi, 1980] . The 
representation of preferences conditional on a state is 
characterized by a convex set of posterior distributions 
obtained through application of Bayes rule to each one 
of the distributions in the set of priors1. 
There are other methods for creating sets of pro ba­
bility distributions: inner and outer measures [Good, 
1983; Halpern and Fagin, 1992; Ruspini, 1987; Sup­
pes, 1974] , intervals of probability (commonly gener­
ated by lower probability) [Breese and Fertig, 1991; 
Chrisman, 1995; Fine, 1988; H. E. Kyburg Jr., 1987; 
1 An introduction to technical aspects of Quasi-Bayesian 
theory, with a larger list of references, can be found at 
http:/ /www.cs.cmu.edu/-fgcozman/qBayes.html. 
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Halpern and Fagin, 1992; Smith, 1961] ,  lower expec­
tations [Walley, 1991] .  The belief functions used in 
Dempster-Shafer theory [Ruspini, 1987; Shafer, 1987] 
have different interpretations but can be represented 
as sets of probabilities. Quasi-Bayesian models gener­
alize these ideas . Given a Quasi-Bayesian convex set of 
probability distributions, a probability interval can be 
created for every event A by defining lower and upper 
bounds : 
.E(A) = inf P(A) PEK P(A) = sup P(A) . PEK 
In a different direction , more general models than tlw 
Quasi-Bayesian one can be created, for instance the­
ories of decision which use simultaneous sets of losses 
and probabilities [Levi, 1980; Seidenfeld, 1993] . 
There are some basic reasons for adopting a Quasi­
Bayesian model [Seidenfeld and Wasserman, 1993]. 
First, Quasi-Bayesian theory builds a realistic account 
of the imperfections in an agent 's beliefs. It can lw 
used to represent poor elicitation of preferences and 
situations of indifference among actions . Second, ro­
bustness studies can be formalized through this model 
[Berger, 1985]. Third, the theory can represent tlw 
disparate opinions of a group of agents [Levi, 1980]. 
3 BUILDING A NEW APPROACH 
TO DECISION-MAKING 
A Bayesian agent can always say that a plan is better 
than, worse than, or equal to another plan. A Quasi­
Bayesian agent may be in a different situation. Con­
sider two plans, a1 and a2, and two distributions J>i 
and p2 in the credal set. Suppose plan a1 has smaller 
expected loss than plan a2 with respect to a probabil­
ity distribution p1, but a2 has smaller expected loss 
with respect to another probability distribution p2. In 
this case , a1 and a2 are not comparable by expected 
loss; both are admissible. What should be done? 
Reactions to this question vary. Fertig and Breese�, 
in their work with interval probabilities, simply w­
port all admissible plans [Breese and Fertig, 1991; 
Fertig and Breese, 1990]. This leaves the actual ac­
tions unspecified. Levi argues that plans should not 
only be admissible, but also be optimal with respect 
to some distr ibution in the credal set. He calls such a 
plan E-admissible [Levi, 1980]. Since there may lw 
several E-admissible plans, Levi suggests secowlary 
guidelines that enforce "security". Others have� sug-­
gested the agent should minimize the maximum possi­
ble value of expected loss, an approach common in Ro­
bust Bayesian Statistics under the name off-minimax 
[Berger, 1985]. 
We suggest that Quasi-Bayesian strategies should spcr:­
ify the admissible decisions and allow the agent to 
monitor the robustness of such decisions. Tlws<� an� 
the two requirements on a plan. There should be no ar­
tificially enforced preference among admissible plans: 
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any admissible plan provide useful guidance if an ac­
tion must be chosen. Robustness should always be 
monitored; what use is a "best" plan if it is based on a 
skewed set of assumptions? As long as a plan provides 
a method for the detection of non-robust situations, 
the agent can pick the first admissible decision that ad­
mits convenient manipulation in the time available for 
decision-making. We call this the New Quasi-Bayesian 
strategy. 
The strategy above contains important elements of 
decision-making as it must be exercised by finite, 
bounded agents. The agent is required to produce 
an admissible answer as quickly as possible, and have 
that as a default solution, as usually required in any­
time planning. Further, the agent is required to detect 
the situations that require additional computation and 
refinement: those are the non-robust situations. 
Compared to the Bayesian strategy, the New Quasi­
Bayesian strategy has some remarkable differences. 
The Bayesian strategy will always be appropriate if 
there is total confidence on the precision of probabil­
ity assessments. If that is not the case, the Bayesian 
strategy calls for a decision analysis of the value of 
further computation and/or introspection [Beckerman 
and Jimison, 1989; Horvitz, 1989; Matheson, 1968; 
Russell and Wefald, 1991]. Such meta-analysis re­
quires probabilities over probabilities, which may be 
harder to elicit than a simple set of bounds on distri­
butions. 
So far we have specified the New Quasi-Bayesian strat­
egy, but it is still unclear how we can use this strategy 
in any decision problem. In order to do so, we must be 
able to quickly generate actions and monitor robust­
ness. Ideally, we must be able to do so faster than the 
usual Bayesian solution, which involves generating ac­
tions and either checking the sensitivity of such actions 
or checking the meta-analysis for those actions. In the 
remainder of the paper, we show that these goals are 
met for the planning to observe problem with Gaussian 
measurements. This is a classic Markov decision prob­
lem; although we describe the solution for univariate 
data, the ideas readily extend to multivariate data. 
4 PLANNING TO OBSERVE WITH 
GAUSSIAN MEASUREMENTS 
We now demonstrate our approach to decision-making 
on the planning to observe problem described as follows: 
A series of independent real-valued observations Xi is 
available to an agent; each observation costs c units of 
loss and is normally distributed with known variance 
1/r and unknown mean B. We indicate this by Xi ""' 
N(xi; B, 1/r). The agent wants to know whether B is 
larger or equal, or smaller than zero. At any point, the 
agent can take a new observation or stop and decide: 
Smaller (d o) and Larger (di). When a decision is 
made, the loss L(B, di) is defined by Table 1. 
Table 1: Losses 
B<O 8>0 
do 0 B 
dt -B 0 
c o-
Figure 2: Planning to Observe with Gaussian Measure­
ments 
Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics of the problem. At 
any point, the agent is facing the same question as to 
whether a decision should be made or an observation 
should be taken. We want to find a sequence of actions 
for the agent. 
4.1 THE CREDAL SET 
Prior beliefs about B translate into a convex set of 
probability distributions, the credal set. A realistic 
model for prior beliefs would take a credal set large 
enough to represent the non-specificity of the agent's 
beliefs. Consider the convex set of distributions com­
posed of Gaussian distributions with mean between 1<1 
and J-12, and variance 1 j 1: 
No {Convex Combinations of N(B; J.lj, 1/r), 
/-lj E [J.lr, J-12]} . ( 1) 
To create a convex set of distributions, it may be neces­
sary to use convex combinations of distributions". To 
build some intuition, consider the semi-plane (T,ft), 
J.l > 0 (inverse of variance x mean). A Gaussian dis­
tribution can be mapped to a point in this semi-plane. 
The Gaussian distributions in the credal set above can 
be mapped to a vertical segment of line at r. Call 
6. = l.u2 - J.ltl the width of the credal set. After each 
measurement we use Bayes rule to update each distri­
bution in the credal set; after n measurements :r:; ( wit.h 
mean x), the posterior credal set is [Giron and Rios, 
1980]: 
Nn {Convex Combinations of 
N (B; tt1, (r + nr ) -1 ) , 
2 A convex combination of a set of functions {!J }/= 1 i� 
given by 'L,:=I Oj fJ, where n.� are non-negative lllllllbt:rs 
that sum to unity. 
M. E [T/}-1 + nr
x' 7/J-2 + nrx] } . (2) J T + nr T + nr 
A fundamental property is that the width of the set 
shrinks to D..r/(r + nr) after n measurements . 
4.2 E-ADMISSIBLE PLANS 
The New Quasi-Bayesian objective is to find an E­
admissible plan and monitor robustness . E-admissible 
plans for "pure" Gaussians in the credal set will be 
convenient since the prior and the likelihood are then 
conjugate [Berger, 1985]. For each Gaussian distribu­
tion in the credal set N0, an E-admissible plan can be 
generated as follows: 
Take the semi-plane (r, �J-), M > 0 (inverse of variance 
x mean) . Divide the plane into three decision regions: 
a Continue region , a StopO region and a Stopl re­
gion. The posterior density after measurement Xn is 
Nn, represented by a point in the semi-plane ( T, J.t). 
The plan is: check whether the posterior Nn is in Con­
tinue, StopO or Stopl, and respectively take a new 
measurement , stop and pick d0, stop and pick d1. The 
plan is determined by the decision regions , which are 
created by dynamic programming (value iteration al­
gorithm) [DeGroot, 1970], as explained in Appendix 
A. 
4.3 PLANNING WHILE ACTING 
The agent has a prior credal set defined by /J-l, �J-2 and 
z:; as measurements are collected, the decision regions 
must be constructed for L. + nr, where n starts from 
zero . 
The whole plan is defined by the upper and lower 
boundaries of the Continue region. The value it­
eration algorithm essentially brackets this region and 
converges to the correct boundary, but every iteration 
requires more effort than the previous iteration. Given 
any finite amount of computation , the agent, Bayesian 
or Quasi-Bayesian, has a chart similar to Figure 3 [De­
Groot, 1970]. There is an Indeterminate region , yet 
to be explored . The agent can shrink the size of the 
Indeterminate region at high computational cost, as 
discussed in Appendix A. A real agent has a region of 
computational indeterminacy: because a finite amount 
of effort is available, not all plans can be evaluated. 
We have returned to the Archers Fable. We have the 
plane ( T, M), and we must hit the boundary of the Con­
tinue region. 
The Bayesian archer wants to find a single curve. Any 
lack of precision in the prior models will require a sen­
sitivity analysis or a meta-analysis. This may lead the 
Bayesian archer to spend a vast amount of computa­
tion if the archer is considering a point close to the 
boundary between Continue and Stop regions. 
The New Quasi-Bayesian archer thinks differently. 
The New Quasi-Bayesian agent recognizes that as soon 
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as there is a point in some region outside the Indeter­
minate region, the whole situation is characterized. If 
the credal set is inside the StopO region , then stop awl 
pick do; if the credal set is inside the Stopl region, 
then stop and pick d1; if the credal set. is inside t!H' 
Continue region , then take another observation. But 
if the credal set intersects more than one region, a non­
robust sit1wtion has been detected. The agent has ;m 
E-admissible action that can be dwsen . but rolmstw's� 
has failed. So the New Quasi-Bayesian archer shrinks 
the Indeterminate region only if all distributions in 
the credal set are inside this region . 
To make this strategy concrete, consider an example. 
Figure 3 shows the four decision regions. Each vertical 
segment represents a set of "pure" Gaussian distribu­
tions with the same varianrP. ThP first hand is t }J(' 
prior band. Since the band is inside the Continue 
region , the agent takes a new measurement \vitlwut 
further computation . Now the band crosses both Con­
tinue and Stopl. The agent knows, without fu,r·thn 
computation, that both taking a new measurement awl 
choosing d1 are admissible, no matter how much addi­
tional effort is spent. If an anytime decision is needed 
at this point , a new observation is taken. But tlw cor­
rect analysis is that the prior imprecision has creatHl 
a non-robust situation where a possible action is to 
continue observing. 
This strategy links the computational indeterminacy 
of the planning algorithm to thf! rn�rlfll inclPtPnninacy 
of the agent., formalizing a connection between s<�arc:h 
effort and model building . There are limits to the d'­
fort that is worthy spending in search for a given h;wl 
of imprecision in a probability assessment. Thi" work 
appears to be the first analysis of this trade-off with 
the tools of Quasi-Bayesian theory. Some new ques­
tions emerge. First, what are the methods that de­
fine the agent's behavior when two decisions are mm­
putable and admissible? Second, what are the ap­
proximation algorithms (value iteration in this case) 
that admit a relationship between computational and 
credal indeterminacies? Third, is the approximation 
algorithm biased, i.e., is it causing the agent to pick 
some regions more than others? This happens, for ('X­
ample, if the Indeterminate region greatly extends 
into one of the Stop regions but not into the other:1• 
4.4 PLANNING IN ADVANCE 
An analysis of this problem must take into account tlw 
possibility that the agent pre-computes the t!Pcision 
regions . In general , suppose the agent wants to pn;­
compute the relevant decision regions for prior width 
D. and prior inverse variance z:. So the agent must prP­
compute the regions for allz:+nr, where n starts from 
zero. 
The New Quasi-Bayesian archer has simply to )!;Uar-
3The fact that this may occur was suggested to us hv 
Prof. T. Seidenfed. 
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J1 
Stopl 
T 
StopO 
Figure 3: Planning to Observe with Gaussian Measurements and Finite Computational Resources 
antee that the band of "pure" Gaussians does not 
fall entirely inside the Indeterminate region. This 
can be done in a finite number of iterations given the 
monotone character of the value iteration algorithm 
(Appendix A) and the fact that the posterior set of 
Gaussians has a width that decreases as .D.TI(T + nr). 
For the New Quasi-Bayesian archer, the question arises 
as to whether or not we can determine the boundaries 
of the Indeterminate region without even iterating 
the value iteration algorithm. Of course, this must 
depend on the characteristics of the initial credal set. 
Suppose the agent starts with a given prior variance 
1/L and a given prior width .D.. The following new re­
sult characterizes the situations that admit direct solu­
tions for the boundaries4. The result is even stronger 
than what we just required: it covers all plans where 
priors have width smaller than .D. and variance smaller 
than 1/L. 
Theorem 1 If z!t(z.D.T 12) < c for T"-112 :'::: z :'::: 
T'-112, then the followin g decision regions completely 
specify the agent's behavio r for I. and .D.: 
u(cJ��) 
Continue 1 11 :::; � 
Stopl J1 � max(O,U(cft)lft) 
StopO J1 :::; min(O, -U( eft) I ft) 
Indeterminate otherwise. 0 
We can summarize the New Quasi-Bayesian strategy 
for generating plans: 
1. Theorem 1 verifies whether the Quasi-Bayesian 
plan can be stored in closed-form. 
4The following definitions are used: rp(s) is the standard 
Gaussian density and iP(s) is the standard Gaussian distri­
bution function; D(s) = ¢(s) + (1- iP(s))s; U(s) is the in-
verse function of D(s); T1 = JCr/2)2 + (r/2)/('r c2)- (r/2) 
and r" = 1/(27rc2). 
2. If not, then the value iteration algorithm shrinks 
the Indeterminate region. When the Indeter­
minate region is smaller than .D. TIT for every T 
larger than I., the decision regions are defined. 
We now look at a situation that occurs in practice 
and leads to increased savings within the New Quasi­
Bayesian framework. Suppose the agent has to provide 
plans for a variety of values of the cost of observations 
c. A situation where this happens is illustrated in the 
next section. Here we consider the costs c1 to belong 
to a finite set of values { c1, c2, . . . , ern}. 
The boundaries of the Indeterminate region must be 
generated for each one of the costs c;. The following 
result is useful: 
Theorem 2 If the conditions of Theorem 1 em� sat­
isfied for a value c*, they are satisfied for· a val'IIJ� c 
larger than c*. 0 
At first, the New Quasi-Bayesian identifies a value of 
Ci that admits closed-form plans using Theorem 1; for 
larger values of ci the plans can be directly stored. For 
other values of Ci, the agent must construct bound­
aries for the decision regions by iteration. The value 
iteration algorithm must shrink the Indeterminate 
region until it is smaller than the width of the credal 
set. Again, as the problem became more involved, tlw 
savings in the New Quasi-Bayesian scheme increased 
when compared to the Bayesian prescription. 
4.5 EVALUATING THE SOLUTION IN A 
REAL PROBLEM 
Consider the construction of a robotic probe for classi­
fication of material based on acoustic signals [Krotkov 
and Klatzky, 1995]. The taks is for a robot to d<'­
cide whether a material belongs to one of two dass<�s 
based on the tangent of the angle of internal hictioll, 
tan¢, which is captured from acoustic analysis of im­
pact sounds. This is equivalent to deciding whether a 
variable f) (linearly related to tan¢) is larger or smaller 
than zero. The losses are given by table 1. Tlw mbot 
is used for a variety of tasks; when the robot is as­
signed to a task, a cost for robot operation is assigned 
based on the number of waiting tasks in a queue. So 
the act of striking a material costs a quantity c; which 
belongs to a finite set of possible costs { c1, c2, . . .  , em}, 
corresponding to the size of the queue. Once the task 
is initiated with a cost c;, the cost remains fixed during 
that task. 
Suppose we want to distinguish metals with tan¢ 
above -11 (aluminum has tan¢ of approximately -2) 
from non-metallic materials with tan¢ below -11 (plas­
tic has tan¢ of approximately -20). We translate these 
values so that f) is zero when tan¢ is -11; now we de­
cide whether f) is larger or smaller than zero. Experi­
ments suggest a Gaussian model for the measurements: 
X; ,..... N(x;; 8, r), with r 
= 
1 [Krotkov and Klatzky, 
1995]. 
Very sparse knowledge about 8 must be translated into 
a belief model. Trying to model this with a single prior 
leads to a number of arbitrary choices. Instead, take 
the prior model to be a Quasi-Bayesian set No with 
variance 1/T_ 
= 
4, JL1 = -5, fJ2 = 5 (so that 6. = 10). 
The last element to be specified is the cost of an ob­
servation. We consider a vector of possible costs, de­
pending on the state of the robot, and assume a linear 
relation: c; = ci, i E {1, _ _  . , 10}, when'! i is the num­
ber of tasks in the robot queue, including the one the 
robot is operating on. We must define c, the cost of an 
observation when no task is waiting. Instead of fixing 
a value of c arbitrarily, we build some intuition by ask­
ing the question: If we had just a single Gaussian prior 
defined by mean /-l, JL > 0, and variance 1/r_, and the 
right to take a single observation, what would we do? 
For fJ larger than a certain value 1--l', we would rather 
take d1 than pay c. So our choice of J-.L' encodes the 
value of c. The value c such that p/ is the boundary 
of the Continue region for r_ is: 
n(�fJ') 
J z:(z:r+r) 
c = 
In our particular example, we took fJ1 = 4, signifying 
that, unless we believed strongly that e > 0, we would 
prefer to take a new observation. In other words, we 
regard the cost c to be relatively small. The use of the 
previous equation with r_ = 0.25, 1--l' = 8 and r = 1 
gives us c = 7.88 x 10-3. We round that and adopt 
c = 0.01 to represent an appropriate cost for the mea­
surements, so we have c; E {0.01, 0.02, . . .  , 0.1 }. 
First we search for closed-form solutions. Theorems 
1 and 2 indicate that values of c > 0.081 lead to 
closed-form plans. We must only obtain plans for 
c; E {0.01, 0.02, ... , 0.08} (for the results in this sec­
tion, we used a symbolic package which we are making 
publicly available; see Appendix B for details). 
For c; = 0.07, the Indeterminate region is shrunk 
sufficiently by a single iteration of the value iteration 
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Figure 4: Decision regions for c; = 0.02. 
algorithm (i.e., reaching p� and fJn. For c; = 0.03, 
two iterations of the algorithm are necessary to oh­
tain the decision regions. Below this value, the com­
putational effort involved in computing the decision 
regions is rather large. Instead of sacrificing time to 
compute these plans, we use "lumped" observations. 
W hen ci E {0.01, 0.02}, we take two observations at a 
time; the "lumped" observation is the average of tlw 
two observations and has precision 0.5. T he bottom 
of Figure 4 shows the resulting decision regions for 
Ci = 0.02. 
The plans have a satisficing character in which the�y 
are admissible in the light of prior beliefs, yet they atT 
open to challenge: during operation, the robustm?ss 
of any decision may be compared to other admissible 
decisions and better courses of action can be leamc�d 
or experimented. There is no need to obtain a sin­
gle "best" plan and then conduct sensitivity analysis 
on it: the overall strategy already encodes a.ll rolmst 
and non-robust situations the agent may face. Since' 
the credal set and the decision regions are available to 
the agent, robustness questions can be dealt with in a 
straightforward manner. From this simple examph� W(' 
notice how the questions of model precision, computa­
tional effort and robustness can be all tied together in 
the New Quasi-Bayesian framework. 
5 CONCLUSION 
We have proposed a new approach to decision-makiug 
with Quasi-Bayesian models. Quasi-Ba.y,�siall tlwory 
maintains that a convex set of probability distributions 
captures the beliefs of an agent. The theory docs uot. 
specify how two decisions are to be compan�d wlwu 
they are both admissible. This has led to a gn�at. deal 
of anxiety among researchers, who have proposrd addi­
tional constraints to allow any comparison to be made�. 
We depart in a somewhat radical way from this tradi­
tion: instead we propose that any admissible decision 
can be chosen, but that robustness must be monit.on�d 
by the agent. A non-robust decision must be refined if 
possible. If there is no time for refinement, a default 
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admissible action is used. 
We have demonstrated this approach to decision­
making in a problem of planning to observe, where prior 
beliefs are captured by a set of Gaussian distributions. 
We demonstrate how to monitor robustness and how 
to choose E-admissible actions. Our proposal can be 
extended to the class of planning to observe problems 
with multivariate data or with general distributions 
and conjugate priors (for example, beta priors with 
binomial observations [Lindley and Barnett, 1965]). 
Further research is needed to extend these ideas to 
other, more general decision problems. 
The plan generation algorithm here developed is, to 
the best of our knowledge, the first example of a sit­
uation where Quasi-Bayesian theory helps to reduce 
the complexity of generating a decision plan. This is 
due to our focus on the robustness, rather than the 
optimality, of a solution . We expect this approach to 
shed light on the relationship between rationality re­
quirements and computational effort .  Note that we do 
not suggest that models should be imprecise to facil­
itate search. We do suggest that the use of a model 
should be compatible with its precision. The Bayesian 
strategy sometimes seems excessive in that it forces a 
precise model into a problem and then demands op­
timality or meta-analysis with respect to that model. 
A Quasi-Bayesian approach that focuses on robustness 
and computational effort can offer a new perspective 
for decision making. 
The theory developed above admits a different, pos­
sibly fruitful, interpretation. Suppose an agent has a 
Quasi-Bayesian model and the agent is not interested 
in the robustness of actions; instead, the agent wishes 
to generate admissible actions as fast as possible. This 
interpretation of Quasi-Bayesian decision making (as 
advocated by [Good, 1983]) is that the agent has ex­
hausted preferences and can pick admissible actions 
arbitrarily. We demonstrated that , for the planning to 
observe problem, the agent can generate E-admissible 
plans faster than a Quasi-Bayesian agent could gener­
ate a "best" plan. 
A THE QUASI-BAYESIAN RISK 
We wish to minimize the Bayes risk for a Gaussian 
prior with mean /-1, variance 1/r by using a plan J. 
The Bayes risk is 
P(f..L,r,J) = E[L(B,J(Xt .. . Xn)) +nc]. 
Note that the number of observations n is also a ran­
dom variable to be averaged in the expectation. Call 
p(J.I, r) the value of the Bayes risk for the Bayesian 
best plan. 
Dynamic programming applied to this minimization 
problem leads to a value iteration algorithm [DeGroot, 
1970]. Very briefly, the algorithm assumes that two 
initial guesses of p are given: iJb(f..L, T) and p�(f..L, T) , 
such that p0(f..L, T) � p(J.I, r) � p�(f..L, r) . 
Two iterations compose the algorithm, one for p;J(/<, r) 
and another for p� (11, r) . Each iteration is (prime� arc 
dropped since the next expression can be used both 
for Po and iJ�): 
. (OCV"TI�-LI) mm VT , 
[- (TIL+ ry )] ) 
E Pi 
T 
+ 1" , T + 7" + c . ( 3) 
The following fact is guaranteed for any 'i [DeGroot., 
1970] (intuitively, the algorithm "sandwiches" p(JL, T)): 
p�(f..L, T)::; p:+df-L,r) � p(p,,r) � p:'+1(p,,T)::; p';'(JL,T). 
The result is: 
• if p;(fl, r) = Po(fJ, r) and fl 2 0, then (T, 11) is in 
a Stopl region; 
• if p;(/-1, r ) = po(f..L, r) and p, � 0, then (r, JL) is iu 
a StopO region; 
• if p;' (f..L, T) =1- p0 (p, T) , then ( r, p,) is in the Con­
tinue region. 
This produces the decision regions, with the Continue 
region between the StopO and Stopl regions .  Intu­
itively, the algorithm "sandwiches" the Indetermi­
nate region. 
In order to start value iteration, the following choices 
are adequate: Po(f..L, r) = 0 (always smaller than 
p(f..L,r)), and p�(fl,T) = Po(fl,r), where Po(fl,T) = 
rl(?rMI). The function po(f..L, r) is always larger than 
p(p, r) [DeGroot, 1970]. 
B A PACKAGE FOR 
QUASI-BAYESIAN PLAN 
GENERATION 
The results discussed in this paper were impk­
mented in a Mathematica™ package which is pub­
licly available through anonymous ftp. Connect to 
ftp.cs.cmu.edu as anonymous, go to the directory 
/afs/cs/project/lri-3/ftp/outgoing/ and get th<� 
file quasi-bayes. tar. Use the tar program and read tlw 
README file for the necessary guidance. 
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